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Abstract

A nationally representative sample of respondents estimated their fatality risks from four
types of natural disasters, and indicated whether they favored governmental disaster
relief. For all hazards, including auto accident risks, most respondents assessed their
risks as being below average, with one-third assessing them as average. Individuals from
high-risk states, or with experience with disasters, estimate risks higher, though by less
than reasonable calculations require. Four-fifths of our respondents favor government
relief for disaster victims, but only one-third do for victims in high-risk areas.
Individuals who perceive themselves at higher risk are more supportive of government
assistance.

Keywords disaster, risk belief, disaster relief, compassion, efficient compassion,
hurricane, flood, terrorism, national survey, Lorenz Curve

JEL Classification D81, D80, Q54, H53

2

The United States has experienced its greatest natural and man-made disasters in recent
years. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina led to the largest level of insured losses to property in
the history of the United States. The 9/11/2001 attack on the World Trade Center, the
Pentagon, and four airliners was by far the most devastating terrorism attack ever on the
nation. Each event seared the nation’s psyche.
How people perceive and respond to these disasters is of fundamental interest. To
the extent that losses can be reduced through self-protection or self-insurance, people’s
risk beliefs will affect the extent to which they will undertake measures to reduce their
losses. Natural disasters and other “acts of God” are not totally unanticipated and
unpreventable. Those who build a beachfront home in a hurricane zone are exposed to
much greater risk of hurricane damage than those who live inland.1 Protection against
terrorism risks is less subject to individual control, though maintaining an adequate life
insurance policy can reduce the economic deprivation to one’s survivors. Following the
9/11 terrorism attack and recent natural disasters, the government made tremendous
efforts to aid and rebuild. Public perceptions of the desirability of such assistance will
govern the degree of public support for post-disaster aid.
This paper reports on evidence from an original national survey that focused on
the public’s perception of natural disaster and terrorism risks and the degree of support
for different policy interventions. How do people perceive the risks of disasters? Do

In a recent statement, ten climate experts who disagree about global warming observed that “‘the main
hurricane problem facing the United States’…is an ongoing ‘lemming-like march to the sea’ in the form of
unabated coastal development in vulnerable places, and in the lack of changes in government policies and
corporate and individual behavior that are driving the trend” (Revkin 2006).
1
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these perceptions vary in a plausible manner with actual risk levels based on information
gleaned from their geographic location and personal experience?
What types of government relief policies do people favor, and in what
circumstances? What is the source of such preferences? Are they governed by selfinterest with a concern for precedent, implying that people at higher risk would be more
generous? Or does compassion play the predominant role? We use the term compassion,
rather than altruism, when individuals are willing to assist others who have suffered
significant losses, because the preference is more circumscribed than merely helping
those who are worse off, perhaps because of weak job skills. And where people are
compassionate, is there a concern for moral hazard, implying that their willingness to
help would be tempered by an efficiency consideration, namely not to provide an
incentive to locate in high-risk areas? Differences in the extent to which the public
supports relief efforts of different kinds in New Orleans have led to months in which such
efforts ground to a halt due to a lack of policy clarity on which areas of the city should be
rebuilt and which should not. Rebuilding the high-risk areas is inefficient because it
generates the prospect of either excess expenditures on assets that need protection, or
substantial future expected losses accompanied by inevitable pressures for continued
bailouts at the public’s expense. Failure to rebuild these areas is a politically charged
issue primarily because the poor, black segments of the New Orleans populations are
concentrated in areas at greater risk, which produces lower real estate values and more
affordable living.
To explore the public’s views on such risks and different relief policies, we
designed and administered a major national survey. Section 1 briefly summarizes the
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nationally representative sample used for our survey and describes the survey instrument.
Our results provide a unique, detailed perspective on disaster risks. We compare natural
disasters with both automobile accident risks and terrorism risks to put our results on
natural disasters in perspective. Section 2 examines respondents’ beliefs about different
risks and the determinants of these risk beliefs. We find that most people rate themselves
as being of average or below-average risk irrespective of the risk considered. There are,
however, important differences in risk beliefs across respondents and types of risk.
Section 3 analyzes respondents’ beliefs about how government should respond to these
hazards. As one might expect, we find evidence of considerable self-interest, with people
living in high natural disaster risk or terrorism risk areas being more supportive of aid for
the hazards to which they are exposed. However, there is also evidence of tremendous
compassion, though where relevant restrained by moral hazard concerns.

1. Background Information on the Survey
We designed and commissioned a survey consisting of a series of questions
regarding respondents’ risk beliefs and their attitudes toward various policy responses to
disasters. Detailed personal characteristic and background questions were also included,
to serve as covariates in our empirical analysis. The text of many of these survey
questions is reported below in conjunction with the pertinent empirical results.
Our data were secured using a Web-based survey administered to a sample from
the Knowledge Networks (KN) panel. We pre-tested the survey in March 2006,
administering it to over 100 subjects. This pre-test employed identical questions to those
analyzed in this paper. This enables an important contrast, since in early April 2006,
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shortly after the pre-test was completed and before our main test, major tornadoes hit the
Southeast, particularly the Tennessee area.2 The final survey was administered April 11
to April 25, 2006 following these tornadoes.
Both the pretest and the final survey were administered by KN to a nationally
representative sample of respondents age 18 and older. Respondents took the survey on
their computer or Web TV. The survey takes about 20 minutes. The completion rate for
the survey was 79 percent. While 1,135 surveys were at least partially completed, we
focus on the 1,077 observations for which we have complete data on all variables of
interest. Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2 summarize the sample characteristics and
variable means and standard deviations.
The sample for the final survey mirrored the national adult population. For
concreteness, we sometimes compare the weighted completed interviews and the Current
Population Survey benchmarks for February 2006.3 Our sample divides evenly between
men and women, a negligible 0.1 percent difference from the national average. Some of
the age categories equal the national fractions; the largest difference is 0.2 percent for
those age 18-29 and those 30-44. The racial breakdowns for blacks, whites, and
Hispanics differ by no more than 0.1 percent from the national statistics. Each of the
education categories likewise has a discrepancy of at most 0.1 percent from the national
figures. The regional breakdowns are often identical to the national average, with the
largest difference being that the sample has 0.2 percent fewer respondents from the
See McFadden, Robert D., et al. (2006). “A Barrage of Storms Batters 8 States, Leaving Death and
Debris.” New York Times, 4 April, Final Edition; Emery, Theo. (2006). “Digging Out from Deadly
Tornadoes, Tennessee is Struck by More.” New York Times, 9 April, Final Edition.
3
The sample is weighted to account for some minor deviations from an equal probability design. For
example, the panel never includes more than one adult per household and includes only half of the potential
panel participants contacted who had telephone numbers but for which KN could not find an address. The
weighted completed interviews are very similar to the unweighted numbers—47.4 percent males
unweighted and 48.1 percent males weighted.
2
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Midwest. In short, the sample tracks the national population breakdowns remarkably
well. It is not a convenience sample but a true, nationally representative sample that
meets the highest standards of representativeness.

2. Risk Beliefs for Natural Disasters and Other Risks
We start by exploring how people assess their risks from natural disasters. In
doing so, we address comparable risk belief questions for auto accident risks and
terrorism risks. These comparisons help put the natural disaster risks in perspective.
Auto accident risks are precisely estimated, well-known hazards that have been the
subject of numerous previous analyses. Indeed, auto accident risks often are the anchor
given to respondents in risk belief surveys so that they can think sensibly about other
risks in the survey.4 Terrorism risks provide a different basis of comparison with natural
disasters because, like natural disasters, they too tend to be dramatic, low-probability
events that are highly publicized.5 Unlike auto accident risks, they are poorly understood,
causal mechanisms for them are widely debated, and risk assessments for them are highly
diffuse. Moreover, whereas auto accident risk levels are influenced considerably by
personal safety-related behavior, such as driving speed and drunk driving, terrorism risks
tend to be beyond individual control. Natural disaster risks involve both some exogenous
nature-related risk components as well as aspects of personal choice, such as picking an
at-risk location.
Given our focus on three classes of risks of quite disparate magnitude and
precision, the challenge in designing the survey was to develop risk belief questions that
4

See Lichtenstein et al.(1978).
There is a considerable literature on perception and responses to low probability events. For a review see
Camerer and Kunreuther (1989) and Kunreuther and Pauly (2004).
5
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could be compared across these different hazards. While quantitative risk questions seem
ideal, respondents often have difficulty in assessing probabilities as small as the risks of
being killed by terrorists. For example, even if the terrorism attacks of 2001 were to be
repeated annually, the fatality risk would be under 1/100,000 per year for a random
citizen. The annual fatality risks from natural disasters are much lower.

2.1 Risk benchmarks, averages and medians, personal experience
Even order of magnitude changes in current risk levels would be hard for most
respondents to assess, i.e., to say whether their personal risk was one in ten thousand, or
one in one million, or one in ten million or one hundred million. Accordingly, we asked
respondents to compare their risk level from a danger to the average risk level of others.6
More specifically, the risk belief questions for auto accident risks, natural disaster
risks, and terrorism risks took a common form. The question first provided information
that would enable respondents to assess the average risk across the population. The
question then asked respondents whether they considered their own risk to be above
average, average, or below average. The specific text of these questions was as follows:
Many of the following questions will ask you to compare programs that reduce
auto accident risks and other types of hazards. Each year just under 40,000 people
in vehicles die in traffic accidents in the United States. On the average day about
100 people die due to traffic accidents. These risks are isolated deaths. Even for
major accidents the number of people killed in a particular accident is not great.
How would you rate your risk compared to the average driver?
I have an average fatality risk….................... 1
I have an above-average fatality risk............. 2
6

One approach to eliciting terrorism risk assessments that was used in Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003) was
to ask the total number of people who would be killed in the U.S. next year in terrorism attacks. But such
questions would be influenced by anchoring effects in the current survey, which gives respondents
information on the average number of deaths from each cause. Moreover, the risks vary by region, and the
regional variation is of substantial interest and will not be reflected in the national estimates of fatalities.
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I have a below-average fatality risk............... 3

In contrast, natural disasters kill large numbers of people at the same time and are
major national catastrophes. Hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, and earthquakes are
major types of disasters. Hurricane Katrina killed over 1,000 people, and every
year natural disasters kill over 100 people on average. How would you rate your
risk of being killed by a natural disaster?
I have an average fatality risk……................ 1
I have an above-average fatality risk............. 2
I have a below-average fatality risk............... 3
Natural disasters aren’t the only risks that kill many people at the same time.
Attacks by international terrorists also can cause a catastrophic number of deaths.
The 9/11 terrorist attack killed 2,976 people. How would your risk from terrorists
compare to the average American’s?
I have an average fatality risk.......................... 1
I have an above-average fatality risk............... 2
I have a below-average fatality risk……......... 3

One danger arising from asking for comparisons with “average Americans” is that
mathematically oriented respondents might recognize that risk levels are in fact highly
skewed, with a small percent of the population at substantially elevated risk. Thus, 98%
of the population may indeed be at below-average risk of a fatality from our four types of
natural disasters, which tend to strike specific geographic areas. The real contrast one
might have wished was with the American at median risk. But we recognized that asking
that question would have confused most of our respondents. Moreover, the median risk
value for the risks in this survey is zero or quite close to it, so that the median American
reference point would not have been informative. Some respondents may have used at
least some element of “median reasoning” when responding to our average question. We
follow in a long tradition in asking about risk levels relative to the average.
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Our principal purpose in using our risk questions is to establish a comparative risk
rating across different types of risk, thus putting the natural disaster risk beliefs into a
more general risk perception context.
Auto accident risk questions asked in relative terms have become a staple in the
optimism bias literature. Rethans (1979) first showed that the overwhelming majority of
drivers considered themselves to face average or below-average risk. Some might
interpret this result as implying that people are overoptimistic and underestimate the risk.
However, it may be that due to the skewed nature of the risk distribution across the
population, most people correctly conclude that they are below average in risk. Our
questions, which provide people with numbers of deaths in the total population, may spur
them to think in terms of means rather than medians. If this is true for automobiles, it is
likely true for the other risks included in the survey.
For a variety of reasons, most respondents will view themselves as facing average
or below-average risks. Few people may be willing to find fault with themselves and rate
themselves as bad drivers. Some respondents also select “average” as their response to
all such comparative questions posed in a complicated survey to move quickly to
complete the survey.7 To the extent that respondents adopt “average” as their timeminimizing response to taking our survey, that strategy should affect all risk belief
questions equivalently. Some analysts have also hypothesized that the below-average
fatality risk responses to auto accident risk questions may reflect the degree to which
people believe, perhaps incorrectly, that they can exercise control over the risk. It should
also be noted that even when people rate themselves as being of below-average risk or
7

Viscusi (2002) presents survey evidence indicating that some respondents consistently rate themselves as
being average on many disparate dimensions—stress level, income, degree of worry, and a variety of health
risks.
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average risk, survey evidence on consumer behavior indicates that people’s actual costrisk tradeoff decisions do not reflect underestimation of the risk (Viscusi and Magat,
1987).
The reference points indicating fatality experience for each of the questions were
chosen to be informative, but the contents are not exactly parallel because of the unique
nature of the 9/11 attack. The survey apprises respondents of the number of motorvehicle deaths per year and per day, the number of people killed by Hurricane Katrina
and the average number killed annually by natural disasters, and the total number of
deaths from the 9/11 terrorist attack.
Table 1 reports the distribution of responses for each of these risks. Consistent
with the literature, averaging across the three risk categories, the great majority of
respondents—92.4 percent—believe that they face average or below-average fatality
risks.8 These percentages vary only a modest amount across the risk categories—from
91.5 percent for automobile hazards to 93.5 percent for natural disasters, with terrorism
risks in between at 92 percent. Just over half of all respondents believe that they face
below-average risks, and 41.3 percent believe they face average risks. Natural disaster
risks and terrorism risks involve little personal control but nevertheless have a higher
percentage of respondents rating themselves as being of below-average risk. These
patterns are inconsistent with the common explanation that risk belief patterns such as
those exhibited in the auto accident context are due to overestimation of the degree of
personal control and the accompanying unwillingness to find fault with one’s own
driving skills.

8

See Weinstein and Klein (1996) for similar “optimistic” results.
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Insert Table 1 About Here

It is quite reasonable that the majority of respondents believe they face belowaverage fatality risks from natural disasters and terrorism attacks. If they recognize that
risk levels are skewed, with a few people at substantially elevated risk. Most people do
not live in earthquake zones, exposed beachfront areas in the Southeast, or tornado
corridors. Their risks will be much lower than the quite substantial risks faced by the
small fraction of people living in such high-risk locales. Similarly, risks from terrorist
attacks are presumably quite low for most of the United States, notwithstanding the
Department of Homeland Security’s ill-considered ranking that identifies more terrorism
targets in Indiana than in New York.9

2.2 Personal experience and risk beliefs

Personal experience with a natural disaster may affect individual risk beliefs.
From the standpoint of rational Bayesian learning, one would expect assessed risks to rise
after experiencing a natural disaster. The Availability Heuristic may also be at work,
although the influences of rational and irrational influences are difficult to disentangle.10
The survey consequently included questions to ascertain whether the respondent had
experienced a hurricane, flood, earthquake or tornado. Assuming they had not moved a
substantial distance, personal experience should greatly increase people’s current risk
estimates, as we show below.

9
10

See Lipton, Eric. (2006). “Come One, Come All, Join the Terror Target List.” New York Times, 12 July.
See Tversky and Kahnemann (1974) for discussion of the Availability Heuristic.
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Table 2 presents the cross tabulation of these disaster experiences with the
corresponding risk beliefs. Notably, for these different categories of disasters from 282
to 321 people in the sample, or just under one-third, had experienced each of these risks.
Table 2 organizes the data with information on those who did not experience the disaster
in the first two columns and information on those who experienced the disaster in the
final two columns. The distribution of the influence of these events differs somewhat by
the particular disaster. Experiencing a hurricane or a tornado decreases the percentage
who rate their risks below average by about 10 percent, but has a minimal effect on flood
and earthquake perceptions. For each risk, having experience with it shifts perceived risk
upwards.
Insert Table 2 About Here
We conducted Wilcoxen rank sum tests using the logical ordering below-average,
then average, and then above-average. These tests yield z-statistics of 3.473 for having
experienced a hurricane and 2.964 for having experienced a tornado. The comparable
differences for having experienced a flood (z = 0.869) or an earthquake (z = 0.708) are
not statistically significant. Somewhat strikingly, even after experiencing any of these
disasters the percentage who rate their risks as being above average ranges from only 7.8
percent to 10.6 percent.
Personal information is probably a more telling indicator of risk than state of
residence, since there is so much interstate variability in risk level. Nevertheless,
identifying the high-risk states proves very telling. We identify the four high hurricane
risk states: Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas,11 which between them hold over

11

This listing is consistent with the insurance industry experiences reported by Swiss Re, as discussed in
Born and Viscusi (2006), this issue.
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13 percent of respondents in our sample. The risk belief summary in Table 3 indicates
that living in a hurricane state substantially alters risk beliefs. Based on the Wilcoxen
rank sum test, these differences are highly significant (z = 5.977). The percentage of
people who view the fatality risk as being below-average is 24 percent lower, where this
difference is distributed fairly evenly between the two remaining categories. The fact
that not everybody in these states perceives an elevated risk is also not surprising because
inland areas in, for example, Dallas, Texas are at much lower risk than the Texas average.

Insert Table 3 About Here

2.3 The distribution of risk across states, Lorenz curves, and rational updates

Our results show that individuals in higher risk states are more likely to place
themselves in a higher risk category. But what would rational calculation show? To
investigate this question, we looked at fatalities from each of our four categories of
natural disasters over the past 50 years. We then computed fatalities per capita for each
state, and produced what in effect is a Lorenz Curve for each type of disaster, and for
automobile fatalities. The data for earthquakes and tornadoes is from 1950-1994, for
autos from 1994-2004, and for floods from 1995-2004. That is, for each source of
fatalities, we computed what percent of the population is required to produce what
percent of the fatalities. Our per capita calculations used the 2000 census, which is
obviously a gross simplification, since the national population has grown substantially.
Counterbalancing this, fatalities per capita have mostly decreased over this period. The
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Lorenz curves for these five types of disasters are shown in Figure 1. Note that the
curves for the natural disasters are highly bowed, implying that a small fraction of the
population accounts for a large percentage of the fatalities, though some are much more
bowed than others. Indeed, to account for half of the fatalities, you need the following
percentages of the population: (1) hurricanes, 14%, (2) floods, 22%, (3) earthquakes,
1%, (4) tornadoes, 9%, and (5) auto accidents, 35%.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Figure 1. Lorenz Curve for Five Risks
(state data)

Given such skewed risk levels for natural disaster fatalities across states, we would
expect individuals to update probabilities significantly, and raise their posterior risk
assessments, if they had personal experience with a disaster. (The updating would be
more intense if we computed results over smaller geographic areas.)
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In short, although people with experiences with natural disasters update their risk
levels, it is likely that they do not do so sufficiently, as seen in Table 2. Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) refer to the tendency to update insufficiently as anchoring. Zeckhauser
(1996, p. 115), specifically addressing catastrophes, notes that: “Neither humans nor
society deal effectively with information, particularly probabilistic information.”

2.4 Statistical results on risk beliefs

To explore the determinants of beliefs about natural disaster fatality risks, we
explore ordered probit results for the above-average, average, and below-average risk
categories. We report regressions based on the Knowledge Networks sampling weights,
but the results are almost identical to the unweighted results because the sample closely
mirrors the U.S. population. The ordered probit coefficients have been transformed to
reflect the marginal influence of each variable.
Table 4 reports five sets of regression estimates; the differences arise because
different sets of region variables and disaster experience variables are included. The
continuous variables included in all equations are Age (in years) and Years of education.
The remaining variables in one or more equations are all 0-1 dummy variables for
Female; Black, non-Hispanic; Other/multiple race, non-Hispanic; Hispanic, all races;
Mid-Atlantic region, East-North-Central region, West-North Central region, South
Atlantic region, East-South Central region, West-South Central region, Mountain region,
Pacific region, Metropolitan residence, Household income (in tens of thousands of
dollars); Household income, top category; Republican, Current smoker, Experienced
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natural disaster, Experienced hurricane, Experienced flood, Experienced earthquake,
Experienced tornado, Hurricane state, and Hurricane state interacted with Experienced
hurricane. The excluded categories in the regressions are male, white/non-Hispanic, and
New England.
Insert Table 4 About Here
The equations we examined appear in their respective columns. Equation 1
includes the full set of demographic variables and whether the respondent has
experienced a natural disaster. Quite reasonably, people in the high-tornado-risk states in
the West-North Central region, the high-hurricane-risk states of the South Atlantic, EastSouth Central, and West-South Central regions, and the high-earthquake-risk states of the
Pacific region perceive themselves as being at greater risk of suffering from these
particular disasters.12 Better-educated people rate their risks as being lower, which may
reflect their understanding that risk is skewed, but this is a matter worthy of further study.
Republicans also assess risks as being lower. The lower risk beliefs held by welleducated and Republican respondents suggests that they may have less of a personal
stake in disaster relief efforts. There is suggestive evidence about this below. As
expected, having experienced a natural disaster has a powerful positive effect on risk
beliefs.
Equation 2 distinguishes the effect of natural disaster experiences by the
particular type of disaster. The combined disaster experience variable in equation 1 had a
significant positive effect on risk beliefs for natural disasters in general. Looking at the
risks individually, experiencing a tornado or a hurricane boosts risk beliefs, but

12

The listing of the states corresponding to these categories appears in the Appendix. New England is the
excluded regional category.
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experiencing a flood or an earthquake is not influential.13 These multivariate results
consequently mirror the mean patterns in Table 2.
Equations 3-5 include variables indicating whether the respondent lives in a
hurricane state, and an interaction of hurricane state residence with hurricane experience.
They omit the regional variables that may substantially capture the influence of the
hurricane state variable. The results are quite consistent across these three specifications.
One effect is consistently strong and significant, namely the interactive influence of
hurricane state and having experienced a hurricane. Due to the strong interrelationship of
these variables, it may be that they are influential individually, but the most powerful
effect is accounted for by the interaction, perhaps because one’s own experience is
reinforced by learning of experiences with other hurricanes striking nearby.
The final survey results that form the basis of the estimates reported thus far were
estimated using a sample from mid-April 2006. However, we have an additional sample
of 115 pre-test respondents, queried just before a series of fatal tornadoes hit the
Southeast in early April 2006. Given the power of the Availability Heuristic and
Bayesian learning, one would expect that the effect of the variable for having experienced
a tornado would be greater for the sample polled after the tornadoes than before. In
ordered probit regressions, not reported, we included an interaction between the tornado
experience variable and whether the sample was polled after the tornado. There was a
marked upward shift in the tornado experience coefficient in the post-tornadoes sample.14

13

Looking at Figure 1, the flood result is not too surprising, since it is the least skewed of the four natural
disasters. Earthquakes are the most skewed of our risks. However, a recent experience has two
counterbalancing effects. It updates and raises the long-term risk level. But it lowers the immediate risk,
since pressure has been released in the fault.
14
More specifically, the interaction variable had a coefficient of 0.468 with a standard error of 0.234, while
the experienced tornado variable remained statistically insignificant.
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People will likely do a worse job estimating their risks from terrorism than from
natural disasters. People in different regions presumably are also less able to distinguish
differences in risk, because of the dearth and imprecision of knowledge about the
distribution of terrorism risk. To be sure, major cities appear to be prominent terrorism
targets, which may sufficiently skew risks so that everyone else is at below–average risk.
But are residents of Colorado at greater or lower risk of a terrorism attack than residents
of Georgia?
The ordered probit estimates reported in Table 5 show that respondents’ risk
beliefs are diffuse for terrorism risks. Few of the demographic variables are statistically
significant, though older respondents view themselves as at lower risk, and non-Hispanic
blacks view themselves as at higher risk. Residence in a metropolitan area has a
powerful positive influence, consistent with the past pattern of terrorism attacks in the
United States and abroad. This result is also reminiscent of the finding by Fischhoff et al.
(2003) that proximity to the World Trade Center increases terrorism risk beliefs since
terror risk judgments often involve people imagining a repetition of the 9/11 experience.
The effect of living in a metropolitan area is equivalent in magnitude to the effect of
being a frequent flyer, namely taking more than 6 plane trips per year.15

Insert Table 5 About Here

The risk belief results for both natural hazards and terrorism risks in most respects
are quite sensible in direction, but insufficient in magnitude. People who live in highly
15

This variable is significant at the 10% level, two-sided, or 5% level one-sided test level. On a theoretical
basis one would hypothesize that more plane trips should boost the risk, making a one-sided test
appropriate.
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vulnerable areas should assess greater risks, and they do. People who have experienced
natural disasters should assess greater risks, as they do with hurricanes and tornadoes,
though not floods. Nevertheless, the level at which they assess this risk is well below
what our Bayesian calculations indicate is reasonable.16 And the much more frequent and
geographically concentrated natural hazards should exhibit more interpersonal
differences than terrorism risks, which are not even well understood by government
officials charged with the task of preventing terrorism attacks. And that is what we find.

3. Attitudes Toward Government Disaster Relief
After major disasters strike, there is invariably a major infusion of both private
and government relief assistance. Some of this assistance is funded in advance through
contributions to subsidized flood insurance. There is also considerable post-disaster aid
for which there are no charges paid either ex ante or ex post.
We distinguish three different possible motivations for governmental relief
efforts. First, public support for aid may be governed by individual self-interest. To the
extent that people believe that they too will be at elevated risk for catastrophic losses,
they will support disaster aid to establish a precedent. Second, people may be motivated
by pure compassion. Irrespective of why people have suffered the damages from
disasters, they may support assistance that will help restore the victims’ welfare to or
toward their pre-disaster levels. Third, support for relief efforts may stem from what we
term “efficient compassion.” Efficient compassion supports relief efforts but is less
willing to provide aid if the damage arose because of problems of moral hazard or a

16

Even if everyone understood risk skewness, and was focusing on average as opposed to median, virtually
all of those without personal experience should rate themselves below average.
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failure by disaster victims to take advantage of the protections already offered by the
market. For example, people who knowingly choose to live in identified high-risk areas,
and insurance companies that fail to take avail themselves of appropriate reinsurance
opportunities, will be deemed less deserving of assistance.
To explore these different sources of support for government relief policies, we
examined several natural disaster and terrorism contexts. The three natural disaster aid
scenarios involved recovery efforts generally, assistance to those who live in high-risk
areas, and assistance to people who return to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina and
rebuild in high-risk areas. The survey text for these three questions was as follows:
The U.S. government subsidizes insurance programs to cover property losses
from natural disasters, and the U.S. government often provides money to help in
the recovery efforts. Do you believe the U.S. government should provide
subsidized insurance and compensation to victims of natural disasters such as
hurricanes, floods, tornados, and earthquakes?
Yes................................................................... 1
No ................................................................... 2

In some cases people who are victims of natural disasters have purposely chosen
to live in a risky area. Often, these are attractive and expensive locations, such as
along a beach or next to a river. Do you believe that the U.S. government should
provide subsidized insurance and compensation to victims of natural disasters
who chose to live in high-risk areas?
Yes................................................................... 1
No.................................................................... 2

After disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, people rebuild houses that have been
destroyed. In some cases these houses are rebuilt in high-risk areas, such as the
low lying areas of New Orleans that will be vulnerable to future flooding. If
people do rebuild in areas the U.S. government indicates are high-risk, do you
believe the U.S. government should provide compensation if a major hurricane
strikes New Orleans again?
Yes................................................................... 1
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No.................................................................... 2
The first disaster relief question pertains to general support for disaster insurance
and compensation after the major types of natural disasters. This question raised no
explicit concerns regarding moral hazard or inefficient self-insurance or self-protective
behavior. For the entire sample, 82.2 percent supported such assistance.
The second disaster relief question raises the issue of people choosing to live in a
risky area that exposed them to a greater level of risk. Given the voluntary nature of such
risk taking, those exhibiting efficient compassion should be less willing to provide relief
in this situation. That prediction is borne out, as only 37.0 percent favor relief in this
situation, as compared to 82.2 percent in the initial case.
The third question addresses a specific type of moral hazard situation that pertains
specifically to the rebuilding efforts in New Orleans. Unlike the previous question,
which highlighted the possibility of providing aid to perhaps less sympathetic owners of
expensive beachfront homes, this question pertains to homeowners attempting to rebuild
their homes in the high-risk areas of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, who are for
the most part poor and have lost a lot. Compassion would suggest that aid is merited, but
such a decision would bear a strong component of inefficiency. Only a minority of
respondents—36.1 percent—were willing to support assistance to people suffering losses
in high-risk New Orleans areas following the rebuilding efforts.
To explore how personal self-interest influences these different levels of support,
the three panels in Table 6 summarize the support for each policy by those at the three
different levels of personally assessed risk of death from natural disasters. The degree of
support rises as one moves across the columns from the below-average risk group to the
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average risk group and then to the above-average risk group, showing that self-interest
does play a role. The differences across the different risk perception categories are
statistically significant in all three instances, with Wilcoxen rank sum test values of z =
2.082 for victims in general, 4.490 for victims exposed to high voluntary risks, and 2.205
for victims of the next New Orleans hurricane. While the expected pattern is borne out,
the extent of the increased support for relief from moving from the below-average risk
group to the above-average risk group is only 5.3 percent for aid to New Orleans and 6.9
percent for relief when there is no explicit moral hazard issue. The moral hazard question
exhibits the greatest influence of personal risk levels; there is a 19.7 percent upswing in
the level of support across risk levels. Apparently moral hazard is not as much of a
concern if individuals have a strong self-interest in maintaining relief efforts that will be
of benefit to them.

Insert Table 6 About Here

To explore what personal characteristics determine the levels of support for relief
efforts, Table 7 reports a series of probit regressions on the probability of support, where
the coefficients have been transformed to reflect marginal probabilities. The first two
regression columns are for the first two relief questions and the third column is for aid to
New Orleans after the next hurricane.

Insert Table 7 About Here
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Many of the significant effects show a consistent pattern across all three relief
questions. Older respondents are less willing to support relief efforts for victims living in
high-risk areas or in New Orleans after the next hurricane, even after controlling for
household income and other background characteristics. However, age imposes no such
reluctance for the initial disaster risk question. It is only when people are knowingly
behaving in an inefficient manner that older respondents decrease their levels of support
in equations 2 and 3.
Groups that are generally more liberal politically, namely female and nonHispanic black respondents, are more supportive of assistance. Women have a greater
likelihood of being willing to support government relief efforts generally, but not when
there is inefficient behavior in equations 2 and 3. Black respondents have a greater
willingness to support general relief than does the omitted category of white respondents.
Interestingly, non-Hispanic black respondents are much more likely to support relief in
all cases, even when people live in high-risk areas, as in equations 2 and 3 of Table 7. As
the New Orleans experience indicates, the residents of many of these high-risk areas tend
to be poor and, in the case of New Orleans, predominantly black. The greater
affordability of homes in areas where land values are low because of the greater risk
tends to produce racial differences. Black non-Hispanic survey respondents—
presumably sensitive to such causality and the horrific New Orleans experience—are
much more willing to support government relief efforts to continue support even though
the victim has chosen to live in a risky locale.
The regional characteristic variables are not as influential in the aid equations as
in the earlier risk belief equations. Perhaps the impetus for relief does not vary greatly
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across the United States. However, people who live in high-risk areas seem to have
greater tolerance for moral hazard in equation 2, as exemplified by the positive effects of
residing in the Pacific and West-South Central regions.
No such regional variations are observed for equation 3 representing aid to New
Orleans. None of the broad regional groups is statistically significant at the usual levels.
In probit regressions not reported, we omit these broad regional categories and explore
whether living in a hurricane state or being a resident of Louisiana or Mississippi boosted
the levels of support for aid to New Orleans after the next hurricane. Neither of these
variables is statistically significant.
Political orientation is a main driver of the support for relief, not just for the
efficient compassion questions, but for all the relief options. In every instance,
Republicans have a consistently lower probability of supporting the relief policies than do
Democrats and independents. After controlling for political affiliation, blacks have
higher probabilities for support; females also have higher probabilities, though not where
moral hazard is a prime factor. Presumably, these groups are more liberal than their mere
political affiliation indicates.
The equations also included a measure of individual risk-taking behavior—the
general health risk exposure of the respondent as reflected in whether they currently
smoke cigarettes. Smokers face a considerable smoking-related mortality risk; their
probability of premature death due to smoking is 1/6 to 1/3. The smoker variable
consequently captures willingness to expose oneself to extremely large health risks.
Beyond this, the smoker variable may also reflect a tolerance for others who take risks
and are guilty of moral hazard, since smokers are frequent targets of criticism for their
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own risk-taking behavior. For the two relief questions involving individual choices to
engage in risky behavior, smokers are more forgiving of decisions involving moral
hazard and are more willing to support relief. Both effects are significant at the 10
percent level. However, for Equation (1) in which moral hazard plays a minor role, there
is no significant smoker effect.
Respondents who believe that they face a below-average disaster fatality risk.
This group is significantly less supportive of relief efforts except in Equation (1), which
pertains to the situation of efficient compassion. The moral hazard scenarios generate the
greatest negative differential support for relief among those who perceive their own
natural disaster risk to be below average.
The terrorism component of the survey included similar questions regarding
government relief. The survey included the possibility of relief aid to victims of
terrorism. It also inquired about relief for insurance companies, which one would expect
to be much less sympathetic recipients of assistance, hence to get lower levels of support.
The specific questions were as follows:
After the 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center the U.S. government
provided compensation to the families of the terrorism victims to make up for the
income losses their families experienced. Do you believe that in the future the
government should provide such compensation to U.S. victims of international
terrorists?
Yes................................................................... 1
No.................................................................... 2

Insurance companies also suffer losses after major terrorism attacks such as 9/11.
Should the U.S. government provide insurance coverage to insurance companies
to reduce the financial risks companies might face from major terrorist attacks?
Yes................................................................... 1
No.................................................................... 2
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A substantial majority, 77.1 percent of respondents, favor aid to terrorism victims.
A surprisingly high 52.1 percent favor aid to insurance companies, presumably indicating
some comprehension of market function, for example, that such relief would
predominantly flow through to insureds.17
Table 8 distinguishes the level of support for these two types of government
assistance as a function of the individual’s perceived personal risk of death from
terrorism. Based on the Wilcoxen rank sum tests, the willingness to support terrorism
victims (z = 3.649) or insurance companies (z = 2.590) differs significantly across the
different risk belief categories, though without consistent patterns of influence. The first
set of results for aiding victims displays no consistent pattern, whereas one would have
expected the levels of support to rise as subjective risk rises. The support for aid to
insurance companies is more responsive to individual risk beliefs, increasing from 48.6
percent for the below-average risk category to 62.8 percent for the above-average risk
category.

Insert Table 8 About Here

As with the regression results for terrorism risk beliefs, the probit regressions for the two
terrorism-aid questions show far fewer significant effects than the natural hazard
regressions. This difference arises in part because unlike natural hazards, which are
geographically concentrated in well-known areas, terrorism risks are poorly understood.
Indeed, none of the regional dummy variables is statistically significant. Perhaps more
17

To determine how much of aid to insurance companies would translate to lower rates, or the ability to
make payouts given a catastrophic incident, would be a difficult calculation even for economists.
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importantly, people may feel that whereas people can choose to live in areas not
threatened by natural disasters, terrorism risks are beyond their control, and are at least
partly the responsibility of a government that failed to protect them.
Several of the personal characteristic variables display patterns that mirror the
natural hazard results. Older respondents are less willing to support either type of postterrorism relief. Non-Hispanic blacks and woman are more supportive of aiding
terrorism victims after an attack, but only women would aid insurance companies.
Better-educated respondents are less supportive of post-terrorist attack aid.

Insert Table 9 about here

The negative effect of the Republican variable parallels the natural disaster
results. Republicans are less supportive of aid to terrorism victims, with a coefficient that
is large absolutely, and both negative and significant. They are relatively less stingy with
insurance companies: their insurance company coefficient, though also negative, is only
one-third the value of that for victims, and statistically insignificant. Given traditional
understandings about political attitudes, and beliefs or skepticism about trickle down
processes, it is not surprising that blacks are much less likely to help insurance
companies, whereas Republicans are less likely to help victims directly.
Of the various personal risk variables, the Current smoker variable is of greatest
interest. Smoking is by far the riskiest personal consumption activity that people engage
in on a large scale. This variable consequently provides an excellent measure of overall
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attitudes toward risk-taking behavior. The Current smoker variable has an effect that
accords with prior findings about risk takers. Smokers are more supportive of aiding
victims of terrorism, just as they were often more supportive of aiding natural disaster
victims. Frequent flyers who take more than 6 plane trips per year are not more
supportive of relief, and the personal fatality risk assessments display the same
inconsistent pattern as the cross tabulations in Table 8.

4. Conclusion
This paper explored two broad questions: 1. What factors drive individuals’ beliefs about
their risks from various disasters, and how accurate are those beliefs? 2. What policies
do individuals favor for disaster relief, and how do those policies relate to their assessed
risks?
The answer to the first question is that risk beliefs have many rational
components, but fall short of what one would expect with fully rational Bayesian
assessments of risk. Personal experience and location-related risk influence risk
assessments in the right direction, but insufficiently. These factors should have a very
powerful influence, as our Lorenz Curve for fatality risks by state shows that natural
disasters risks are highly concentrated, unlike auto fatality risks.
For each of our four natural disasters, more than half of our respondents thought
that their fatality risk from natural disasters was below average, and another roughly
thirty-five percent thought their risk was average. Even people who had experienced
disasters did not differ markedly from those who had not.
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A common explanation for apparent underestimation of risks, such as those from
auto accidents, is that individuals suffer from an illusion of control. That explanation
does not apply to natural disasters. A plausible hypothesis, worthy of further study, is
that individuals actually understand the skewness in the distribution of risk. Though only
half of the population can be below median risk, the vast majority are below average in
risk. That is surely true for auto accidents as well, the favorite domain for “control”
hypotheses.
More than four-fifths of our respondents favored government assistance for
victims of natural disasters, but this fraction fell to only one-third when the natural
disasters happened to people living in high-risk areas. This decline suggests that
respondents intuitively understand the concept of moral hazard. We label this
phenomenon “efficient compassion.” That is, there is a strong element of compassion in
their responses, but it is tempered when disaster victims have knowingly exposed
themselves to high risk. Individuals who perceive themselves to be at greater personal
risk are more supportive of government assistance, as are groups that tend to be liberal
politically. Black respondents, who may have been particularly struck by the
governmental failure to rescue the black population of New Orleans from Hurricane
Katrina, are much more supportive of continued aid to that city. In short, policy
preferences for disaster relief reflect both compassion for the unfortunate, and a dollop of
self-interest.
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Table 1. Subjective Level of Risk by Type of Fatality

Subjective level of risk
Below-average fatality risk
Average fatality risk
Above-average fatality risk
Observations

Auto
fatality risk
Number Percent
473
43.9
513
47.6
91
8.5
1,077
100.0

Natural disaster
fatality risk
Number Percent
631
58.6
376
34.9
70
6.5
1,077
100.0

Terrorism
fatality risk
Number Percent
545
50.6
446
41.4
86
8.0
1,077
100.0
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Table 2. Subjective Level of Natural Disaster Fatality Risk
With and Without Experience with the Disaster

Subjective level of natural disaster
fatality risk
Below-average fatality risk
Average fatality risk
Above-average fatality risk
Observations

Number
487
267
40
794

Below-average fatality risk
Average fatality risk
Above-average fatality risk
Observations

Number
470
279
46
795

Below-average fatality risk
Average fatality risk
Above-average fatality risk
Observations

Number
466
278
46
790

Below-average fatality risk
Average fatality risk
Above-average fatality risk
Observations

Number
465
246
45
756

Experienced hurricane
No
Yes
Percent
Number
61.3
144
33.6
109
5.0
30
100.0
283
Experienced flood
No
Yes
Percent
Number
59.1
161
35.1
97
5.8
24
100.0
282
Experienced earthquake
No
Yes
Percent
Number
59.0
165
35.2
98
5.8
24
100.0
287
Experienced tornado
No
Yes
Percent
Number
61.5
166
32.5
130
6.0
25
100.0
321

Percent
50.9
38.5
10.6
100.0

Percent
57.1
34.4
8.5
100.0

Percent
57.5
34.1
8.4
100.0

Percent
51.7
40.5
7.8
100.0
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Table 3. Subjective Level of Natural Disaster Fatality Risk
for Hurricane and Not-Hurricane States a
Subjective level of natural
disaster fatality risk
Below-average fatality risk
Average fatality risk
Above-average fatality risk
Observations
a

Hurricane state
Number
Percent
55
37.9
67
46.2
23
15.9
145
100.0

Not-hurricane state
Number
Percent
576
61.8
309
33.2
47
5.0
932
100.0

Hurricane states are Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
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Table 4. Ordered Probit Regressions for
Subjective Natural Disaster Fatality Risk a

Independent Variables
Age
Female
Black, non-Hispanic
Other/multiple race,
non-Hispanic
Hispanic, all races
Mid-Atlantic
East-North Central
West-North Central
South Atlantic
East-South Central
West-South Central
Mountain
Pacific
Metropolitan residence
Years of education
Household income
Household income,
top category
Republican
Current smoker

(1)
0.001
(0.003)
-0.065
(0.091)
-0.089
(0.142)
-0.138
(0.250)
-0.130
(0.167)
0.170
(0.242)
0.321
(0.237)
0.606*
(0.265)
0.781**
(0.228)
0.613*
(0.240)
0.663**
(0.244)
-0.067
(0.281)
0.641**
(0.232)
0.210+
(0.125)
-0.042*
(0.020)
-0.009
(0.015)
-0.421
(0.484)

(2)
0.0004
(0.003)
-0.066
(0.091)
-0.085
(0.141)
-0.139
(0.255)
-0.113
(0.165)
0.181
(0.246)
0.304
(0.241)
0.600*
(0.273)
0.730**
(0.231)
0.583*
(0.248)
0.646**
(0.248)
-0.095
(0.276)
0.668*
(0.260)
0.197
(0.124)
-0.045*
(0.020)
-0.008
(0.015)
-0.507
(0.487)

(3)
0.0004
(0.003)
-0.063
(0.091)
-0.084
(0.142)
-0.161
(0.257)
-0.152
(0.164)
0.170
(0.247)
0.283
(0.242)
0.569*
(0.275)
0.644**
(0.241)
0.524*
(0.251)
0.434
(0.293)
-0.105
(0.276)
0.663*
(0.259)
0.169
(0.127)
-0.044*
(0.020)
-0.007
(0.015)
-0.538
(0.477)

(4)
0.001
(0.003)
-0.072
(0.091)
-0.061
(0.142)
-0.163
(0.261)
-0.150
(0.163)
0.130
(0.249)
0.223
(0.244)
0.516+
(0.279)
0.601*
(0.243)
0.492+
(0.253)
0.499+
(0.290)
-0.165
(0.277)
0.597*
(0.262)
0.170
(0.127)
-0.039+
(0.020)
-0.009
(0.015)
-0.476
(0.461)

(5)
-0.0003
(0.003)
-0.053
(0.092)
-0.027
(0.143)
-0.111
(0.273)
-0.166
(0.156)

-0.188+
(0.097)
0.122
(0.112)

-0.189+
(0.097)
0.106
(0.113)

-0.198*
(0.098)
0.113
(0.113)

-0.188+
(0.098)
0.117
(0.113)

-0.177+
(0.097)
0.109
(0.111)

0.093
(0.128)
-0.038+
(0.020)
-0.010
(0.015)
-0.465
(0.468)
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Experienced natural disaster

0.281**
(0.102)

Experienced hurricane

0.215*
(0.108)
0.032
(0.107)
0.145
(0.136)
0.248*
(0.103)

Experienced flood
Experienced earthquake
Experienced tornado
Hurricane state
Hurricane state x experienced
Hurricane
Observations

1077

1077

0.168
(0.112)
0.034
(0.107)
0.140
(0.135)
0.255*
(0.103)
0.279
(0.175)

1077

0.046
(0.129)
0.031
(0.107)
0.154
(0.136)
0.250*
(0.103)
-0.138
(0.241)
0.641*
(0.264)
1077

0.081
(0.123)
0.0001
(0.108)
0.230*
(0.109)
0.257**
(0.099)
0.050
(0.187)
0.656*
(0.255)
1077

a

Coefficient estimates (and standard errors in parentheses) from ordered probits on dependent variable,
subjective natural disaster fatality risk, which varies from 1 (below-average risk), to 2 (average risk), to 3
(above-average risk). Regressions adjust for sample weights.
+ significant at 10% level, * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level; two-tailed test.
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Table 5. Ordered Probit Regressions on Subjective Terrorism Fatality Risk a

Independent Variables
Age
Female
Black, non-Hispanic
Other/multiple race, non-Hispanic
Hispanic, all races
Mid-Atlantic
East-North Central
West-North Central
South Atlantic
East-South Central
West-South Central
Mountain
Pacific
Metropolitan residence
Years of education
Household income
Household income, top category

Coefficient
(asymptotic std. error)
-0.005*
(0.003)
0.138
(0.088)
0.389**
(0.139)
0.007
(0.243)
-0.018
(0.142)
0.230
(0.233)
-0.229
(0.233)
0.023
(0.253)
0.330
(0.230)
-0.023
(0.276)
0.242
(0.242)
0.084
(0.255)
0.034
(0.228)
0.508**
(0.118)
-0.001
(0.020)
-0.004
(0.014)
0.206
(0.360)
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Republican

-0.020
(0.093)
-0.102
(0.106)
0.545+
(0.296)

Current smoker
More than 6 plane trips per year
Observations

1077

a

Coefficient estimates (asymptotic standard errors in parentheses) from ordered probits
on dependent variable, subjective terrorism fatality risk, which varies from 1 (belowaverage risk), to 2 (average risk), to 3 (above-average risk). Regressions adjust for
sample weights.
+ significant at 10% level, * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level; two-tailed
test.
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Table 6. Preferences for Government Assistance by
Subjective Level of Natural Disaster Fatality Risk
Assist victims of natural disasters
Subjective level of natural disaster fatality risk
Below-average
Average
Above-average
fatality risk
fatality risk
fatality risk
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
No
125
19.8
58
15.4
9
12.9
Yes
506
80.2
318
84.6
61
87.1
Assist victims of natural disasters living in high risk areas
Subjective level of natural disaster fatality risk
Below-average
Average
Above-average
fatality risk
fatality risk
fatality risk
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
No
431
68.3
213
56.6
34
48.6
Yes
200
31.7
163
43.4
36
51.4
Assist victims of next New Orleans hurricane
Subjective level of natural disaster fatality risk
Below-average
Average
Above-average
fatality risk
fatality risk
fatality risk
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
No
421
66.7
224
59.6
43
61.4
Yes
210
33.3
152
40.4
27
38.6
Observations
631
100.0
376
100.0
70
100.0

1

Table 7. Ordered Probit Regressions for
Government Relief for Natural Disaster Losses a

(1)
Any
natural
disaster
victims
-0.003
(0.003)
0.278*
(0.111)
0.498*
(0.232)
0.119
(0.235)
0.028
(0.186)
0.014
(0.309)
-0.017
(0.308)
-0.149
(0.336)
0.093
(0.298)
-0.199
(0.340)
-0.067
(0.316)
-0.015
(0.323)
-0.032
(0.300)
0.022
(0.140)
-0.058*
(0.028)
0.005
(0.018)
-0.338
(0.409)
-0.687**
(0.114)
0.145

Independent Variables

Age
Female
Black, non-Hispanic
Other/multiple race, non-Hispanic
Hispanic, all races
Mid-Atlantic
East-North Central
West-North Central
South Atlantic
East-South Central
West-South Central
Mountain
Pacific
Metropolitan residence
Years of education
Household income
Household income, top category
Republican
Current smoker

2

(2)
Victims
living in
high risk
areas
-0.019**
(0.003)
0.110
(0.100)
0.657**
(0.159)
-0.447+
(0.244)
-0.042
(0.162)
0.450
(0.277)
0.354
(0.273)
-0.153
(0.338)
0.239
(0.270)
0.261
(0.304)
0.639*
(0.299)
0.589*
(0.283)
0.579*
(0.273)
0.025
(0.137)
-0.001
(0.023)
0.009
(0.016)
-0.043
(0.401)
-0.385**
(0.104)
0.207+

(3)
Victims in
New
Orleans
next time
-0.016**
(0.003)
0.081
(0.101)
0.724**
(0.165)
0.080
(0.250)
0.215
(0.160)
0.169
(0.259)
-0.051
(0.257)
-0.290
(0.316)
-0.197
(0.253)
-0.062
(0.291)
0.287
(0.286)
0.221
(0.273)
-0.072
(0.257)
-0.038
(0.139)
-0.017
(0.024)
0.0001
(0.016)
0.286
(0.377)
-0.577**
(0.105)
0.189+

(0.132)
-0.237*
(0.117)
-0.124
(0.230)
-0.191
(0.123)

Experienced natural disaster
Above-average disaster fatality risk
Below-average disaster fatality risk

(0.114)
0.018
(0.108)
0.162
(0.211)
-0.338**
(0.108)

(0.115)
-0.024
(0.108)
-0.161
(0.207)
-0.264*
(0.109)

Hurricane state
Louisiana or Mississippi resident
Constant

2.322**
0.284
(0.482)
(0.427)
1077
1077

Observations
a

0.848*
(0.429)
1077

Coefficient estimates (and standard errors in parentheses) from probit regressions on indicator
variables, where 1 indicates individual chose “yes” in answer to the aid question. Excluded
categories in regressions include subjective average natural disaster fatality risk. Regressions
adjust for sample weights.
+ significant at 10% level, * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level; two-tailed test.
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Table 8. Preference for Government Assistance for Terrorism Losses by
Subjective Personal Level of Terrorism Fatality Risk
Assist victims of terrorist attacks
Subjective personal level of terrorism fatality risk
Below-average
Average
Above-average
fatality risk
fatality risk
fatality risk
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
No
155
28.4
69
15.5
23
26.7
Yes
390
71.6
377
84.5
63
73.3
Assist insurance companies
Subjective personal level of terrorism fatality risk
Below-average
Average
Above-average
fatality risk
fatality risk
fatality risk
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
No
280
51.4
204
45.7
32
37.2
Yes
265
48.6
242
54.3
54
62.8
Observations
545
100.0
446
100.0
86
100.0
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Table 9. Ordered Probit Regressions for
Government Relief for Terrorism Losses a

Independent Variables
Age
Female
Black, non-Hispanic
Other/multiple race, non-Hispanic
Hispanic, all races
Mid-Atlantic
East-North Central
West-North Central
South Atlantic
East-South Central
West-South Central
Mountain
Pacific
Metropolitan residence
Years of education
Household income
Household income, top category
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(1)
Terrorism
victims
-0.011**
(0.003)
0.198+
(0.106)
0.570*
(0.229)
0.042
(0.266)
0.209
(0.203)
0.338
(0.294)
-0.060
(0.301)
-0.271
(0.327)
-0.121
(0.277)
-0.205
(0.315)
-0.152
(0.306)
0.068
(0.307)
0.034
(0.285)
0.195
(0.134)
-0.041+
(0.025)
-0.016
(0.017)
0.051
(0.435)

(2)
Insurance
companies
-0.011**
(0.003)
0.184+
(0.096)
0.135
(0.165)
0.096
(0.248)
0.110
(0.158)
0.317
(0.254)
-0.074
(0.252)
-0.067
(0.285)
0.162
(0.242)
-0.087
(0.273)
-0.192
(0.267)
-0.221
(0.265)
-0.151
(0.248)
0.161
(0.126)
-0.040+
(0.022)
-0.010
(0.016)
0.167
(0.409)

Republican
Current smoker
More than 6 plane trips per year
Above-average terrorism fatality risk
Below-average terrorism fatality risk
Constant
Observations
a

-0.298**
(0.110)
0.326*
(0.136)
0.356
(0.327)
-0.643**
(0.211)
-0.408**
(0.115)
1.955**
(0.480)
1077

-0.101
(0.101)
0.095
(0.114)
0.069
(0.265)
-0.085
(0.182)
-0.124
(0.101)
0.923*
(0.403)
1077

Coefficient estimates (and standard errors in parentheses) from probits on indicator variables
given in each column, where 1 indicates individual chose “yes” in answer to the pertinent
terrorism assistance equation. Regressions adjust for sample weights. Excluded categories in
regressions include subjective average terrorism fatality risk.
+ significant at 10% level, * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level; two-tailed test.
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Appendix

Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics, Means and Standard Deviations of the Variables

Variable
Risk and policy choice variables
Above-average disaster fatality risk
Below-average disaster fatality risk
Government should compensate natural disaster
victims
Government should compensate natural disaster
victims living in high risk areas
Government should compensate hurricane
victims in New Orleans after next hurricane
Above-average terrorism fatality risk
Below-average terrorism fatality risk
Government should compensate terrorism
victims
Government should provide terrorism insurance
to insurance companies
Above-average auto fatality risk
Below-average auto fatality risk
Certain risk more important
Independent variables
Age
Female
White, non-Hispanic (excluded category)
Black, non-Hispanic
Other/multiple race, non-Hispanic
Hispanic, all races
New England (excluded category)
Mid-Atlantic
East-North Central
West-North Central
South Atlantic
East-South Central
West-South Central
Mountain
Pacific
Metropolitan residence
Years of education
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Mean

Standard
Deviation

0.065
0.586

0.247
0.493

0.822

0.383

0.370

0.483

0.361
0.080
0.506

0.481
0.271
0.500

0.771

0.421

0.521
0.084
0.439
0.666

0.500
0.278
0.497
0.472

46.931
0.523
0.733
0.104
0.059
0.104
0.041
0.137
0.137
0.060
0.175
0.073
0.085
0.103
0.187
0.820
13.666

16.369
0.500
0.443
0.305
0.237
0.305
0.198
0.344
0.344
0.238
0.381
0.261
0.280
0.304
0.390
0.384
2.421

Household income, in tens of thousands of
dollars
Household income, top category
Republican
Current smoker
Experienced natural disaster
Experienced hurricane
Experienced flood
Experienced earthquake
Experienced tornado
More than 6 plane trips per year
Observations
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5.086
0.018
0.427
0.232
0.643
0.263
0.262
0.266
0.298
0.036
1,077

3.740
0.132
0.495
0.422
0.479
0.440
0.440
0.442
0.458
0.187

Table A.2. States in Each Census Division

New England
(excluded category)

Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Vermont

Mid-Atlantic

New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania

East-North Central

Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio,
Wisconsin

West-North Central

Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, North
Dakota, Minnesota, South Dakota,
Missouri

South Atlantic

Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia

East-South Central

Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi
Tennessee

West-South Central

Arkansas, Louisiana
Oklahoma, Texas

Mountain

Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New
Mexico, Montana, Utah, Nevada,
Wyoming

Pacific

Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon,
Washington
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